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ARGUMENT 
Pursuant to Rule 24(c) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, Appellant and Defendant Images & Attitude, Inc. 
("Images") respectfully submits this Reply Brief of Appellant to 
address new matters set forth in Macris & Associates, Inc.'s 
("Macris & Associates") Brief of Appellee. Macris & Associates 
advances many arguments in defense of Images' appeal; however, 
Images asserts that the two issues addressed herein are dispositive 
of Images' appeal. 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF 
COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL. 
This Court will recall that in Images' Brief of Appel-
lant, Images asserted that the trial court erred in dismissing 
Images' claim for fraudulent inducement on the basis of collateral 
estoppel, a branch of the doctrine of res judicata.1 Images 
asserts that the trial court's application of collateral estoppel 
constitutes plain error since Macris & Associates, Inc. ("Macris & 
Associates") failed to meet its burden of proving by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that the issues in the prior arbitration were 
identical and that the prior arbitration fully and fairly litigated 
the issue of fraudulent inducement between Images and Macris & 
Associates. The trial court's error also constituted plain error 
Collateral estoppel ijs a branch of the doctrine of res judicata. Rinqwood 
v. Foreign Auto Works, Inc., 786 P.2d 1350, 1356 (Utah App. 1990); Madsen v. 
Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah 1988); Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 1369, 1374 n. 
5 (Utah 1988); Mel Trimble Real Estate v. Monte Vista Ranch, Inc., 758 P.2d 451, 
453 (Utah App. 1988); Berry v. Berry, 738 P.2d 246, 247 (Utah App. 1987); Cf. 
Brief of Appellee at 1, n.2. 
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for the reasons that the issues in the prior arbitration were not 
identical to the issues presented in the instant action and Images 
did not have any opportunity to fully and fairly litigate the ques-
tion of whether Images was fraudulently induced into the contract 
with Macris & Associates in the arbitration action between Images 
and Affinity. 
A. Macris & Associates Utterly Failed In Meeting Its 
Burden Of Establishing The Applicability Of The 
Doctrine Of Collateral Estoppel Below. 
The party raising the defense of collateral estoppel has 
the burden of proving the applicability of the doctrine. Timm v. 
Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 1178, 1184 (Utah 1993). In requesting summary 
judgment on the basis of collateral estoppel, Macris & Associates 
utterly failed in its burden of establishing that the issues in the 
two actions were identical and had been fairly and fully litigated. 
Macris & Associates merely presented a Supplemental Memo-
randum in Support of Macris & Associates, Inc.'s and Mike Macris' 
Motion for Summary Judgment Re: Fraudulent Inducement to the trial 
court wherein Macris & Associates alleged that the issues were 
identical and had been fully and fairly litigated (R. 1181-91) . 
However, Macris & Associates presented absolutely no evidence to 
support its bare allegations. Macris & Associates presented no 
affidavits in support of the supplemental memorandum, offered no 
transcriptions of the arbitration hearing, and attached no part of 
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the record in the arbitration proceedings. Macris & Associates did 
not even submit the Arbiter's Order!2 
In contrast, Images presented evidence in the form of 
affidavit testimony demonstrating that at a minimum questions of 
material fact existed with respect to Images' claim against Macris 
& Associates. The Affidavit of Tom Mower, dated September 9, 1993 
(R. 1043-48) set forth material facts which supported Images' claim 
that Images was fraudulently induced by Macris & Associates into 
entering into the contract with Macris & Associates including the 
fact that Macris & Associates made certain representations to 
Images and that Images reasonably relied upon those representations 
in entering into the contract with Macris & Associates. (See also 
Images' Memorandum In Opposition to Macris & Associates, Inc.'s 
Motion for Summary Judgment Re: Fraudulent Inducement, R. 987-
1017). Clearly, where Macris & Associates failed to present any 
evidence of the applicability of the doctrine of collateral estop-
pel and where Images presented evidence demonstrating material 
issues of fact concerning Images' claim for fraudulent inducement, 
it was error for the trial court to dismiss Images' claim for 
fraudulent inducement on the basis of collateral estoppel. 
2Rather, it was Images who presented the trial court with the Order as an 
exhibit to Images' memorandum in opposition to Macris & Associates's supplemental 
memorandum. The Order did not contain findings of fact which was crucial to an 
order of Summary Judgment. 
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B. The Doctrine of Collateral Estoppel Clearly Did Not 
Apply to Images' Claim for Fraudulent Inducement 
Against Macris & Associates. 
Macris & Associates, Inc.'s argument concerning collater-
al estoppel completely ignores one fundamental distinction which 
entirely affects the analysis employed by the trial court and by 
Macris & Associates on appeal. The distinction is that in the 
arbitration proceeding, the parties to that arbitration proceeding 
were Images and Affinity, not Macris & Associates. Accordingly, 
the contract between Images and Macris & Associates could not have 
been fully and fairly litigated. This one obvious fact alone ren-
ders irrelevant Macris & Associates' entire argument contained in 
the Brief of Appellee. 
The following illustration, though unsophisticated, amply 
demonstrates the fallaciousness of Macris & Associates' argument: 
Suppose A is hit in the back of the head with a hard 
object. When A regains consciousness, he sees B and C 
standing above him, each with a slingshot in one hand and 
a pile of rocks in the other. A sustains severe injuries 
as a result of the incident. A brings a civil action 
against B for battery to recover damages resulting from 
being hit in the head with a rock. Upon a motion for 
summary judgment, the trial court specifically finds that 
"A was not injured by being hit in the head by a rock 
thrown by B.ff A then brings a civil action against C to 
recover damages resulting from being hit in the head with 
a rock by C. 
If the trial court in the action against C in the above 
illustration employed Macris & Associates' analysis as contained in 
Section I.B.4. of the Brief of Appellee, the trial court could find 
that the doctrine of collateral estoppel barred A's action against 
C because the trial court in the earlier action made a finding that 
REPLY.BRF (AN/MACRJS) 4 
A had not been hit in the head! Clearly, the application of the 
doctrine of collateral estoppel would be improper in this instance. 
Likewise, collateral estoppel was improperly applied in 
the instant case. The earlier arbitration involved Images' claims 
against Affinity for allegedly fraudulent misrepresentations made 
by Affinity which induced Images into entering into a contract with 
Affinity. Macris & Associates was not a party to the arbitration 
proceedings. Accordingly, Images' contract with Macris & Associ-
ates was not at issue in the earlier arbitration proceeding. The 
doctrine of res judicata, of which collateral estoppel is a branch, 
is designed to preclude issues which either were litigated in a 
prior action, or could have or should have been litigated in a 
prior action. Estate of Covington v. Josephson, 888 P.2d 675, 677 
(Utah App. 1994); Aragon v. Clover Club Foods Co., 857 P.2d 250, 
254 n.6 (Utah App. 1993); Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 247 
(Utah 1988) . Here, Images claims against Macris & Associates were 
not litigated in the arbitration, nor could they or should they 
have been litigated in the arbitration proceeding. Accordingly, 
the application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel to bar 
Images' claim for fraudulent misrepresentation against Macris & 
Associates was improper. 
Macris & Associates' analysis of the difference between 
"ultimate issues" and "evidentiary facts", though impressive, has 
absolutely no bearing to the issue of whether the trial court im-
properly applied the doctrine of collateral estoppel. In the 
sources cited by Macris & Associates to support its position, in-
REPLY.BRF (AN/MACRIS) 5 
eluding the Restatement illustration, the courts dealt with either 
the same parties in the prior and later actions or the same ulti-
mate issues (Brief of Appellee at 25-29). Restatement (Second) of 
Judgments § 27 comment c, illustration 4 (1982) (dealt with A and 
B in both actions); In re Transocean Tender Offer Securities Liti-
gation, 427 F. Supp. 1211 (N.D. 111. 1977) (shareholders sued same 
companies in both actions; Yamaha Corp. of America v. U.S., 961 
F.2d 245 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (Yamaha-America' s rights under section 
526 of the Tariff Act were litigated in prior and later actions); 
Akron Presform Mold Co. v. McNeil Corp., 496 F.2d 230, 235 (6th 
Cir. 1974) ("the unlawful aspects of the license agreement between 
Sun and Presform" were at issue in both actions.); Temple of the 
Lost Sheep, Inc. v. Abrams, 930 F.2d 178, 184-85 (2d Cir. 1991) 
(identical Section 19 83 claims were litigated in both actions); and 
Jones v. United States, 466 F.2d 131, 136 (10th Cir. 1972) (tax 
treatment for payments received pursuant to the same contract at 
issue in both cases). 
Conversely, the present action included Images' claims 
against Macris & Associates relative to the contract between Images 
and Macris & Associates, whereas the prior arbitration dealt with 
Images' claims against Affinity relative to a completely different 
contract between Images and Affinity. While the two cases may have 
had "evidentiary facts" in common, i.e. certain statements made by 
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Michael Macris, an agent of Affinity and Macris & Associates,3 the 
"ultimate issues" were different. One simply cannot separate the 
cause of action for fraudulent inducement from its elements. The 
fact that different contracts and different companies were involved 
are more than mere evidentiary facts but rather affect the ultimate 
issue. Simply because the arbiter found that Images had not been 
fraudulently induced into the contract with Affinity has no bearing 
upon whether Images was fraudulently induced into the contract with 
Macris & Associates. To hold otherwise would be akin to holding 
that since A was not hit in the head by a rock thrown by B, then A 
was not hit in the head by a rock thrown by C. (See illustration 
supra.) 
C. The Trial Court Committed Plain Error in Dismissing 
Images' Claim for Fraudulent Inducement. 
The trial court's error in dismissing Images' claim 
against Macris & Associates for fraudulent inducement rises to the 
magnitude of plain error. This Court has defined plain error as 
follows: 
The f i r s t requirement for a finding of p la in e r ror i s 
tha t the e r ror be "pla in ," i . e . , from our examination of 
the record, we must be able to say that i t should have 
been obvious to a t r i a l court that i t was committing 
e r r o r . . . . The second and somewhat i n t e r r e l a t e d re -
quirement for a finding of p la in er ror i s tha t the e r ror 
3As set forth ea r l i e r , Macris & Associates completely fai led to c i t e to 
portions of the record below to demonstrate that Macris & Associates ever 
establ ished which factual issues were found in the prior a rb i t r a t ion and which 
factual issues were binding upon Images. Moreover, misrepresentations concerning 
such factual issues as the advertising may not have been material to Images's 
contract with Affinity, but would, however, be very material to Images's contract 
with Macris & Associates. 
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affect the substantial rights of [a party], i.e., that 
the error be harmful. 
Davis v. Grand County Service Area, 905 P.2d 888, 892 (Utah App. 
1995) . Images asserts that it should have been obvious to the 
trial court that it was committing error when it misapplied the 
doctrine of collateral estoppel. This is particularly true where 
Images' claims in each action were against different companies as 
a result of separate contracts. 
Clearly, the second requirement for finding plain error 
is likewise met in this case. The substantial rights of Images 
were obviously effected by the denial of its claim for fraudulent 
inducement. Had Images been allowed to present evidence of its 
fraudulent inducement claim, the trial court could have invalidated 
the entire contract resulting in no liability on the part of 
Images. Instead, the trial court erroneously applied the doctrine 
of collateral estoppel and dismissed Images' meritorious cause of 
action. 
Since the trial court committed plain error in applying 
the doctrine of collateral estoppel, it is immaterial whether 
Images asserted, for the first time on appeal, that the claims in 
the two actions were not identical. Utah appellate courts consider 
plain error even where raised for the first time on appeal. State 
v. Irwin, 298 Utah Adv. Rep. 17, 18 (Utah App. Sept. 6, 1996); 
State v. Labrum, 925 P.2d 937, (Utah 1996); Berenda v. Lancrford, 
914 P.2d 45, 51, (Utah 1996); State v. Moreno, 910 P.2d 1245, 1247 
(Utah App. 1996); Davis, 905 P.2d at 892 (Utah App. 1995). Conse-
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quently, it is proper for this Court to review all aspects of the 
trial court's application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel 
for plain error despite Macris & Associates' protestations to the 
contrary. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT MICHAEL 
MACRIS WAS NOT THE AGENT OF MACRIS & ASSOCIATES AND 
THAT MACRIS & ASSOCIATES WAS NOT THE ALTER EGO OF 
MICHAEL MACRIS. 
A. Images Has Sufficiently Marshalled The Evidence In 
Support Of The Trial Court's Findings Of Fact. 
Macris & Associates begins its attack on Images' alter 
ego claim by asserting that Images failed to sufficiently marshal 
the evidence in support of the trial court's findings that the 
actions of Michael Macris were not attributable to Macris & Associ-
ates and that Macris & Associates was not the alter ego of Michael 
Macris. To support its insufficient marshalling argument, Macris 
& Associates purports to offer a summary of evidence supporting the 
trial court's findings. (Brief of Appellee at 34-36). Macris & 
Associates' summary is, at best, disingenuous. 
For instance, Macris & Associates stated in the Brief of 
Appellee: 
10. Others testified that they knew Mike Macris operat-
ed his distributorship through Macris & Associates, 
Inc., and separated his other companies and their 
duties. (See, e.g., Marge Aliparandi [sic] testimo-
ny, R. 4745.) 
(Brief of Appellee at 37) . This statement is a deliberate misrep-
resentation of the record below. At trial, Margie Aliprandi was 
asked by counsel for Macris & Associates: "Do you know whether 
REPLY.BRF (AN/MACRIS) 9 
Macris & Associates was a distributorship with any multi-level 
marketing company?" (R. 4745). In answer to this question, Margie 
Aliprandi responded: "He was my sponsor." This answer actually 
indicates that the distinction between Michael Macris and Macris & 
Associates was blurred for at least Margie Aliprandi. Moreover, as 
set forth in Images' Brief of Appellant, every witness, other than 
the Macrises themselves, testified that they did not understand the 
relationship between Michael Macris and his various companies. 
(See Brief of Appellant at 27-29). 
The other so-called examples of insufficient marshalling 
cited by Macris & Associates are simply immaterial and do not ne-
cessarily support the trial court's findings of fact. Images does 
not dispute that Michael Macris held himself out as the President 
of Macris & Associates or that Macris & Associates was a corpor-
ation. (See Brief of Appellee at 36-37, %'s 2, 3, 7). Nor does 
Images dispute that Macris & Associates kept some corporate rec-
ords. (See Brief of Appellee at 36-37, <H's 8-9). However, these 
factors do not necessarily support a finding that Macris & Associ-
ates was a separate and distinct entity. Any charlatan wishing to 
avoid liability for wrongdoing by hiding behind the facade of a 
corporation would take at least these steps to create the appear-
ance of a separate and distinct corporation. While this evidence 
may support the trial court's findings of fact, they are insignifi-
cant in comparison to the overwhelming evidence suggesting that 
Michael Macris was acting as the agent for Macris & Associates when 
he engaged in competitive activities and that Macris & Associates 
REPLY BRF (AN/MACRIS) 10 
was the alter ego of Michael Macris. The evidence propounded by 
Macris & Associates is "insufficient to support the findings 
against [Images'] attack." State v. Higginbotham, 917 P.2d 545, 
548 (Utah 1996). 
Macris & Associates' other evidentiary examples are 
simply irrelevant. The evidence propounded in Paragraphs 1, 4, 5 
and 6 of Macris & Associates' brief are merely actions taken by Tom 
Mower and/or Images; none of which constitutes evidence of Michael 
Macris' actions or the actions of Macris & Associates. (See Brief 
of Appellee at 36-37) . Macris & Associates' inability to propound 
concrete and sound examples to support its argument for insuffi-
cient marshalling only shows that the evidence supporting the trial 
court's findings was weak. Images fulfilled its obligation to 
marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's findings of 
fact. Images further demonstrated that the marshalled evidence is 
insufficient to support those findings. State v. Higginbotham, 917 
at 548; State v. Moosman, 794 P.2d 474, 475-76 (Utah 1990). 
For instance, the evidence presented to the trial court 
demonstrated that the Images distributors with whom Michael Macris 
worked closely were unaware of any distinct corporate existence of 
Macris & Associates, or that Michael Macris was merely an employee 
of that corporation. (R. 4732-34, 4749, 5591, 5594, 5596 and 5615). 
Moreover, Michael Macris continued to work in the same representa-
tive capacity for Macris & Associates even after he had resigned as 
President of Macris & Associates. He continued to communicate with 
Images on behalf of Macris & Associates, through counsel (Trial 
REPLY.BRF (AN/MACRIS) 11 
Exhibit 9, 39, 54); he continued to write checks on behalf of 
Macris & Associates (R. 5505); and he represented himself as 
President of Macris & Associates even when he was no longer an 
officer (R. 5540) . Finally, even Valerie Macris acknowledged that 
Macris & Associates did not always adhere to corporate formalities 
(R. 5125) . 
There was never any meaningful distinction between Michael 
Macris and Macris & Associates. Rather Michael Macris used the 
corporate shell to shield himself from liability for engaging in 
competitive activities while reaping the rewards of his contract 
between Images and Macris & Associates. Such conduct resulted in 
injustice and inequity to Images. The evidence presented to the 
trial court and to this Court overwhelmingly supports Images' 
position that the trial court erred in making its findings of fact. 
B. Michael Macris And Macris & Associates Engaged In 
Disruptive And Competitive Activities. 
In Section II.D. of the Brief of Appellee, Macris & Asso-
ciates claims that the alleged competitive activities of Macris 
took place after Images allegedly breached the contract with Macris 
& Associates, and therefore, Macris was not contractually restrict-
ed from competing with Images. (Brief of Appellee). This position 
completely ignores the substantial evidence presented at trial that 
Michael Macris was testing and distributing nail gel products not 
endorsed by Images which Michael Macris manufactured for his com-
REPLY.BRF (AN/MACR1S) 12 
panies, Affinity and American Polymer4, to Images distributors long 
before Images allegedly breached the contract with Macris & Associ-
ates (R. 4681, 4683, 4774, 4845). The policies and procedures of 
Images proscribed conduct which "may cause loss to the Company or 
to another Images Distributor." (Trial Exhibit 83 at 7).5 By 
testing unendorsed nail gels, Michael Macris was furthering the 
business of his other companies in competition with Images. 
Michael Macris was also known to the Images distributors as their 
"upline." 
Macris & Associates apparently believes that the only com-
petitive actions of Michael Macris at issue at trial were those 
activities he engaged in while creating Emily Rose, which according 
to Macris & Associates, occurred after the alleged breach by 
Images. (Brief of Appellee at 41). This position is erroneous, 
however, in view of the substantial evidence which suggested that 
Michael Macris was supplying unendorsed nail gels to Images dis-
tributors prior to the alleged breach by Images (Brief of Appellant 
at 25-30). 
Separating the actions of Michael Macris on behalf of him-
self, Macris & Associates, Affinity, American Polymer and Emily 
Rose, was the only way the trial court could rationalize its find-
4American Polymer manufactured nail gels for companies other than Images. 
Therefore, American Polymer was in competition with Images, and Michael Macris, 
acting as an agent for American Polymer, furthered such competition. 
5The Code of Ethics contained in the Images Policies and Procedures also 
forbade the "use of the company name, information, literature, gatherings, 
people, or other Images resources to further other business interests." (Trial 
Exhibit 83 at 7) (emphasis added). 
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ing that Images breached the Agreement with Macris & Associates 
first. However, separating Michael Macris' actions in dealing with 
distributors of Images from Macris' role as President of the upline 
Images' distributorship simply makes no sense and is absolutely 
contrary to the evidence presented at trial. (See Brief of 
Appellant at 25-30). 
A president of a corporate distributorship, working with-
in the scope of his employment as president of the corporate dis-
tributorship is an agent of that corporate distributorship whether 
the president claims he is or not. Horrocks v. Westfalia, 892 P.2d 
14 (Utah App. 1995) (quoting Vicksburg & M. R. Co. v. O'Brien, 119 
U.S. 99, 104, 7 S.Ct. 118, 121 (1886) ("The acts of an agent, with-
in the scope of the authority delegated to him, are deemed the acts 
of the principal. Whatever he does in the lawful exercise of that 
authority is imputable to the principal . . . . ")) . "Even when the 
agent is acting adversely to the principal's interest, the knowl-
edge of the agent may still be imputed to the principal." 
Horrocks, 892 P.2d 14 (Utah App. 1995). 
Clearly, when Michael Macris was providing unendorsed 
gels to Images distributors, his actions should be imputed to his 
employer Macris & Associates, even if he was ostensibly supplying 
those gels for testing for a competing company he owned. It was 
error for the trial court to find otherwise, especially in light of 
the substantial evidence presented at trial. 
Even though Images specifically objects to twelve of the 
factual findings, those factual findings impacted the entire out-
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come of the litigation. For instance, if the trial court had cor-
rectly found that Michael Macris was acting as an agent of Macris 
& Associates when he supplied unendorsed nail gels to Images dis-
tributors for testing, then the trial court would have properly 
found that such conduct constituted a material breach of the Agree-
ment between Images and Macris & Associates. Images, accordingly, 
would have had no further obligation under the Agreement. 
Furthermore, if the trial court had properly found that 
Macris & Associates was the alter ego of Michael Macris, then 
Michael Macris' improper conduct would likewise constituted the 
first material breach of the Agreement. 
Ample evidence was presented to the trial court and to 
this Court (See Brief of Appellant) of Macris' improper conduct. 
This evidence, taken together, overwhelmingly established that 
Michael Macris used the shell of Macris & Associates to shield him-
self from the consequences of his improper conduct in creating com-
peting companies while contractually obligated to Images. The 
trial court's observance of the form of Macris & Associates did in-
deed "sanction a fraud, promote injustice and result in inequity. 
Envirotech Corp. v. Callahan, 872 P.2d 487, 499 (Utah App. 1994). 
These findings were clearly erroneous and should be overturned. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant respectfully re-
quests that this Court reverse the Order and Judgment entered by 
the Third District Court and remand the case to the Third District 
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Court for entry of an Order in favor of Images, no cause of action, 
or in the alternative for a new trial on the issues of fraudulent 
inducement, breach of contract and alter ego as asserted in Images' 
affirmative defenses contained in Images' Amended Counterclaim. 
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